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CRIMINAL APPEALS: PAST, PRESENT, AND 
FUTURE 
CHAD M. OLDFATHER* 
MICHAEL M. O’HEAR** 
This issue of the Marquette Law Review presents materials from the 
Marquette University Law School conference, ―Criminal Appeals: Past, 
Present, and Future,‖ which was held at the Law School on June 15–16, 2009.  
The conference brought together leading criminal law and judicial process 
scholars, as well as a panel of current and former state high court judges and 
justices, to examine enduring and emerging issues relating to the exercise of 
the appellate function in criminal cases. 
Two factors provided the impetus for the conference.  The first is the 
sheer timeliness of the topic.  The past decade has witnessed the emergence of 
widespread concern over the fairness and reliability of the American criminal 
justice system.  The ascendance of DNA evidence, and the resulting wave of 
exonerations, has demonstrated the fallibility of the criminal trial process to 
an extent previously only imaginable.  This suggests the possibility of a 
greater role for appellate courts in policing the accuracy of trials.  At the same 
time, efforts in many jurisdictions to guide and constrain the sentencing 
discretion of trial court judges have already resulted in new responsibilities 
for appellate courts to review the appropriateness of sentences. 
The second impetus for the conference was our sense that there has been a 
relative lack of scholarly attention paid to the institutional role of appellate 
courts in the criminal context.  Most of the scholarship concerning the 
functions of appellate courts, and indeed relating to the judicial role more 
generally, focuses on the civil system.  Yet there are many reasons to believe 
that the lessons do not transfer from one context to another.  Criminal law is 
different.  As Roscoe Pound put the matter seventy years ago: 
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If one looked at the matter with no knowledge of its history 
and as something to be established de novo on the basis of 
modern conceptions of social control, it would seem that 
where life or liberty is at stake, as in a criminal prosecution, a 
rational re-examination of the whole case after trial, at least at 
the instance of a convicted accused, to be made by a tribunal 
insuring the best judicial power in the jurisdiction, in order to 




Of course, Pound’s vision has never held sway.  But it serves to underscore 
the point that the dynamics of criminal cases differ greatly from their civil 
counterparts. 
At the margins, perhaps, the line distinguishing criminal from civil may 
be hard to locate.
2
  But the core criminal case pits an individual, whose liberty 
and perhaps life is on the line, against the resources of the state.  The sides are 
not evenly matched either in terms of resources (in the aggregate, and in most 
cases, the state has more) or the procedural rules that govern (the government 
bears a high burden of proof, and defendants enjoy the protection of 
constitutional rights that apply only to them).  And while the average criminal 
defendant’s goal is simply to prevail, the prosecutor represents the people, and 
has as her goal not merely winning, but rather ―doing justice‖ in some larger 
sense.  These features render criminal litigation quite distinct from the typical 
private law dispute, which generally involves a bilateral dispute over money 
between parties that are, at least in terms of the rules that govern resolution of 
their dispute, relatively evenly matched.
3
  It also differs from public law 
litigation, which often has direct, future implications for non-parties to the 
dispute that may differ in scope and in kind from the implications that 
criminal litigation often has for crime victims.
4
 
The differences between the two systems extend into the appellate sphere, 
and manifest themselves both doctrinally and institutionally.  Appeals in 
criminal cases are asymmetrically available; a convicted defendant can always 
 
1. Roscoe Pound, Introduction, in LESTER B. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL APPEALS IN AMERICA 3 
(1939). 
2. See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 1–5 (5th ed. 
2009). 
3. The classic depiction of this model of adjudication is Lon Fuller’s.  See Lon L. Fuller, The 
Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978). 
4. For the classic statements of the public law model, see Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge 
in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976); Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 
Term—Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979).  For a discussion of the 
relationship between the involvement of victims in the criminal justice system and the civil–criminal 
distinction, see Michael M. O’Hear & Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Dispute Resolution in Criminal 
Law, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2007). 
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appeal, while the government’s ability to appeal is quite limited.
5
  In addition, 
the incentives facing a criminal defendant differ considerably from those 
facing the parties to a civil suit.  For a host of reasons—among them the fact 
that he is likely incarcerated, faces the prospect of living the remainder of his 
life with a criminal conviction, and likely has access to free representation—a 
criminal defendant has little to lose and much to gain from an appeal, and 
consequently is apt to take one even in a case where he is unlikely to be 
successful. 
The institutional setting differs in other ways.  Because criminal appeals 
often involve specialized appellate lawyers on both the prosecution and 
defense sides, the process involves repeat players to a much greater degree 
than is true of civil litigation.  This creates an opportunity for strategic 
lawyering designed to encourage courts to adopt favorable legal standards.
6
  It 
also raises ethical issues for defense lawyers in particular.  They must, on the 
one hand, contend with the situation of the client who they have concluded 
does not have a meritorious appeal, which raises the question of when, if ever, 
an Anders brief is appropriate.
7
  Less obviously, the repeat-playing defense 
lawyer must also be alert to the possibility that she will argue more vigorously 
on behalf of some clients than others.  A former colleague told one of us of a 
conversation he had with an appellate judge (in a social setting), in which the 
judge mused on how helpful it would be if the colleague could somehow 
signify the cases in which he had a ―real‖ issue.  Of course, they both knew 
that this would be improper.  But there remains a danger that an appellate 
defender will convey the impression that this time she really means it. 
Criminal litigation remains predominantly a creature of state court systems.  
This, too, presents a dynamic that differs from that in civil cases.  As recent 
high-profile judicial election campaigns suggest, criminal cases often provide 
good fodder for those seeking to challenge a sitting judge.
8
  We might 
accordingly be concerned that issues related to criminal law play a relatively 
large role in initial judicial selection, and that the potential consequences at the 
ballot box of a ruling in a criminal case might affect the manner in which courts 
 
5. See, e.g., Anne Bowen Poulin, Government Appeals in Criminal Cases: The Myth of 
Asymmetry, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (2008). 
6. Andrew Hessick discusses the government’s ability to do this below.  See Andrew Hessick, 
The Impact of Government Appellate Strategies on the Development of Criminal Law, 93 MARQ. L. 
REV. 477 (2009).  On the defense side, lawyers might choose, for example, to advance arguments for 
changes in the law in cases involving less serious crimes in the hopes that the perceived costs of a 
change and the perceived political consequences of a defendant-favorable ruling would be less. 
7. For a discussion of no-merits briefs, see Randall L. Hodgkinson, No-Merits Briefs 
Undermine the Adversary Process, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 55 (2001).  See also DANIEL J. 
MEADOR, THOMAS E. BAKER & JOAN E. STEINMAN, APPELLATE COURTS: STRUCTURES, 
FUNCTIONS, PROCESSES, AND PERSONNEL 682–700 (2d ed. 2006). 
8. See Joanna M. Shepherd, Money, Politics, and Impartial Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 623, 644 (2009). 
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handle criminal appeals.
9
  A related concern arises from the fact that criminal 
cases involve state courts in the business of applying federal constitutional law 
on a regular basis.  Given that the Supreme Court is largely out of the business 
of error correction, it seems a legitimate concern that federal constitutional 
rights might be underenforced in state courts. 
The differences between the two systems are likewise manifest in more 
narrow, doctrinal senses.  The concepts of ―structural error‖ and ―plain error‖ 
appear primarily, if not exclusively, in criminal appeals.  Both involve 
departures from core norms of the appellate process.
10
  Recognition of 
structural error places an appellate court in the position of denying any 
competence to assess the effects of an error on the judgment.  The 
acknowledgment of plain error involves a departure from the fundamentally 
adversarial nature of our legal system in that it requires the court to recognize 
an error that was not raised in the trial court (while at the same time 
concluding, in effect, that the error was so obvious no one could have missed 
it).  The Anders brief likewise pulls the court out of the reactive role that it 
normally occupies, requiring it to review the record as an advocate for the 
defendant, looking for colorable claims of error.
11
 
The implications of these differences for the nature of the judicial role and 
the design of judicial institutions remain largely unexplored.  The criminal 
justice system necessarily (and properly) entails a certain solicitude toward 
criminal defendants, and consequently requires courts at both the trial and 
appellate levels to step outside the passive, neutral role that remains as an 
ideal in civil cases.  The precise manner in which courts in criminal appeals 
(and criminal cases more generally) are called on to do so differs from the 
manner in which courts depart from the traditional role in public law and 
other sorts of cases that deviate from the typical bilateral private law dispute.  
It may be, then, that as a general matter the role of the judge in criminal law 
litigation is undertheorized. 
* * * 
The conference took place over two days, and included six panels as well 
as a roundtable discussion of five current and former state supreme court 
 
9. But see Aman L. McLeod, A Comparison of the Criminal Appellate Decisions of Appointed 
State Supreme Courts: Insights, Questions, and Implications for Judicial Independence, 
34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 343, 356 (2007) (reporting the results of an empirical study that suggest ―that 
courts whose members were selected with the use of a merit selection commission decided a higher 
percentage of criminal cases in favor of the state than did courts chosen without the use of 
commissions‖). 
10. See MEADOR, BAKER & STEINMAN, supra note 7, at 210; Steven M. Shepard, Note, The 
Case Against Automatic Reversal of Structural Error, 117 YALE L.J. 1180 (2008). 
11. See James E. Duggan & Andrew W. Moeller, Make Way for the ABA: Smith v. Robbins 
Clears a Path for Anders Alternatives, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 65 (2001). 
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justices.
12
  The first panel was devoted to historical perspectives.  Professor 
Roger Fairfax explores the development of the harmless error rule, tracing its 
origins to larger efforts in the early twentieth century to reform criminal 
appellate procedure.
13
  He outlines the ways in which reformers advocated in 
favor of the rule on the grounds that it would make the system more efficient, 
effective, and fair, as well as through such rhetorical devices as tying the lack 
of a harmless error rule to increasing crime rates and portraying appellate 
judges as ―fearful of judging.‖
14
  He concludes by posing the question whether 
the doctrine of harmless error has in application evolved in such a way as to 
meet the goals the reformers sought to achieve.
15
  Professor Frank Bowman 
steps back even farther in time, examining criminal appeals in antebellum 
Missouri through detailed study of a series of individual cases.
16
  He humbly 
disclaims the notion that his consideration of the exploits of lawyers James 
Rollins and Odon Guitar allows for the drawing of ―any profound lessons or 
deep insights.‖
17
  Still, the comparison of that criminal justice system to our 
own helps to underscore the extent to which the contemporary criminal 
appeals system rests on assumptions that are not so inevitable as their 
familiarity might lead us to believe.  Paul Carrington covers more recent 
ground, tracing how current appellate processes have drifted even farther 
away from the ideal in the thirty-four years since he, along with Dan Meador 
and Maurice Rosenberg, published Justice on Appeal, a classic text that 
embodied much of the work of the Advisory Council for Appellate Justice.
18
  
Focusing on the federal courts, he concludes that much of what takes place in 
the guise of criminal litigation is not adjudication but rather ―informal 
bargaining in a bureaucratic process.‖
19
  He forcefully articulates the case for 
―transparency and accountability in a process of adjudication of guilt‖ and 
against ―practices allowing criminal appeals to be papered over by staff work 
so that those appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate give no 
more than glancing attention to the question of whether a proceeding resulting 
 
12. The panelists were Justice James Duggan, New Hampshire Supreme Court; Chief Justice 
Karla Gray (Ret.), Montana Supreme Court; Judge Arlene Johnson, Oklahoma Court of Criminal 
Appeals; Chief Justice Randall Shepard, Indiana Supreme Court; and Judge Diane Sykes, United 
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (and former Justice, Wisconsin Supreme Court).  
13. Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., A Fair Trial, Not a Perfect One: The Early Twentieth-Century 
Campaign for the Harmless Error Rule, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 433 (2009). 
14. Id. at 447. 
15. Id. at 455–57. 
16. Frank O. Bowman, III, Stories of Crimes, Trials, and Appeals in Civil War Era Missouri, 
93 MARQ. L. REV. 349 (2009). 
17. Id. at 376. 
18. Paul D. Carrington, Justice on Appeal in Criminal Cases: A Twentieth-Century Perspective, 
93 MARQ. L. REV. 459 (2009). 
19. Id. at 474. 
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in a conviction was properly conducted.‖
20
  We are fortunate as well to have 
Professor Michael Klarman’s article on the Scottsboro cases, in which he 




The second panel explored institutional roles.  Professor Andrew Hessick 
investigates the government’s role as a repeat player in criminal appeals, and 
considers the strategies the government might employ in furtherance of its 
interest in developing favorable legal rules.
22
  These include its ability to 
select which arguments to raise in a given case and to choose to bring a series 
of cases in a sequence designed to maximize the chances of convincing the 
court to adopt a preferred rule.
23
  He articulates reasons for concern about this 
potential for influence, which include not only the tension between such 
influence and separation of powers, but also the seeming unfairness of the 
government enjoying this power in addition to the various other ways in 
which it enjoys advantages in the criminal process.
24
  Professor Gerald 
Uelmen describes his experience as executive director of the California 
Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice.
25
  He outlines the 
dysfunction of California’s death penalty regime, and conveys the frustrations 
of seeing the Commission’s recommendations fall to a veto.
26
 
The third panel concerned the right to effective assistance of counsel.  
Professor Stephen Smith contends that a recent line of cases represents a shift 
in the Supreme Court’s approach to ineffective assistance claims, one in 
which he contends the Court has taken the right to counsel more seriously.
27
  
Although these recent cases have all involved the imposition of the death 
penalty, he contends that their more stringent standards should not be limited 
to capital cases, for only then will the results of criminal cases regularly 
generate reliable, accurate outcomes.
28
  Professor Greg O’Meara analyzes the 
application of ineffective assistance law in the circuit courts in the wake of the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), and concludes that, 
despite Congress’s efforts in AEDPA to restrict access to habeas review, the 
lower federal courts have required more of defense counsel than the Supreme 
 
20. Id. 
21. Michael J. Klarman, Scottsboro, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 379 (2009). 
22. Hessick, supra note 6. 
23. Id. at 480–90. 
24. Id. at 490–93. 
25. Gerald F. Uelmen, Death Penalty Appeals and Habeas Proceedings: The California 
Experience, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 495 (2009). 
26. Id. at 495–96. 
27. Stephen F. Smith, Taking Strickland Claims Seriously, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 515 (2009). 
28. Id. at 537–42. 
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Court’s cases seem to require.
29
  He suggests two reasons for this trend.  The 
first is that AEDPA ignores the constitutional underpinnings of habeas 
review, and the second is that AEDPA falsely assumes an equivalence 
between the binding nature of statutory text and precedential case law.
30
 
The fourth panel addressed wrongful conviction issues.  Professor Keith 
Findley poses the question of how well the appellate process serves to protect 
against mistaken convictions, and concludes that there is considerable room 
for improvement.
31
  He surveys the recent evidence, much of which has 
emerged from DNA testing, revealing that the criminal justice system has not 
been error-free even with respect to its handling of the most serious crimes.
32
  
He contends that there is a greater role for appellate courts to play in 
protecting against wrongful convictions, and outlines a number of ways in 
which the appellate process might be modified to respond to claims of 
innocence.  Professor Sandra Guerra Thompson focuses on eyewitness 
identification testimony, which is notoriously unreliable and plays a role in a 
large portion of wrongful convictions.
33
  She examined a year’s worth of 
appellate cases involving challenges to eyewitness identification testimony.
34
  
Her study revealed that courts have continued to sanction the use of such 
testimony in circumstances that present misidentification dangers recognized 
by researchers, reformers, and various government and private task forces.
35
 
The fifth panel took up the topic of sentencing appeals.  The discussion 
opens with an article in which Chief Justice Randall Shepard traces the history 
of appellate review of sentences in Indiana.
36
  Amendments to the Indiana 
constitution adopted in the late 1960s provided for an appellate review power 
that, despite taking some time to mature, has led to a meaningful appellate 
role in the sentencing process.  Next, Professor John Pfaff investigates state 
appellate courts’ implementation of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Blakely 
v. Washington
37
 and United States v. Booker,
38
 which created a legal 
 
29. Gregory J. O’Meara, S.J., “You Can’t Get There From Here?”: Ineffective Assistance 
Claims in Federal Circuit Courts After AEDPA, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 545 (2009). 
30. Id. at 557–68. 
31. Keith A. Findley, Innocence Protection in the Appellate Process, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 591 
(2009). 
32. Id. at 593–601. 
33. Sandra Guerra Thompson, Judicial Blindness to Eyewitness Misidentification, 93 MARQ. L. 
REV. 639 (2009). 
34. Id. at 649–57. 
35. Id. at 657–68. 
36. Randall T. Shepard, Robust Appellate Review of Sentences: Just How British is Indiana?, 
93 MARQ. L. REV. 671 (2009). 
37. 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
38. 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
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landscape that he characterizes as ―confusing and self-contradictory.‖
39
  He 
considers the effects of Booker on appellate review of sentencing in three 
states—Indiana, New Jersey, and Tennessee—that have elected to follow it by 
converting their presumptive guidelines to voluntary guidelines.  He 
concludes that Booker has had very little effect in those states, and based on 
his inquiry outlines some issues with which states must grapple in the process 
of determining whether Booker review is normatively desirable.
40
  Professor 
Carissa Byrne Hessick likewise delves into the Supreme Court’s sentencing 
jurisprudence, focusing on the impact of the Court’s decision in Kimbrough v. 
United States,
41
 which concerned district courts’ ability to depart from the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines based on a policy disagreement with the 
Guidelines’ treatment of crack cocaine.
42
  She identifies a series of problems 
and inconsistencies in the resulting regime, and questions the effectiveness of 
appellate review in this context.  In its place, she proposes that the United 
States Sentencing Commission work to persuade district courts that the policy 
underpinnings of the Guidelines are appropriate, with the anticipated result 
being greater sentencing uniformity as courts opt to impose Guidelines 
sentences.
43
  Professor Michael O’Hear examines the nature of the processes 
by which appellate courts engage in review of sentences.
44
  In particular, he 
considers the appropriateness of appellate review directed toward an 
assessment of the adequacy of trial courts’ explanations of the sentences they 
impose.  In the course of making the case for ―explanation review,‖ he 
outlines the relevant jurisprudence under federal and Wisconsin law, and 
articulates a set of principles by which courts should engage in explanation 
review. 
The sixth and final panel presented quantitative research.  Professors Sara 
Benesh and Wendy Martinek address the topic of state court adherence to 
Supreme Court precedent.
45
  They compare the outputs of state supreme 
courts and the federal courts of appeals in cases dealing with criminal 
confessions.  They find that, while both sets of courts are largely compliant 
with Supreme Court precedent, federal courts of appeals appear to be more 
 
39. John F. Pfaff, The Future of Appellate Sentencing Review: Booker in the States, 93 MARQ. 
L. REV. 683, 685 (2009). 
40. Id. at 712–15. 
41. 552 U.S. 85 (2007). 
42. Carissa Byrne Hessick, Appellate Review of Sentencing Policy Decisions After Kimbrough, 
93 MARQ. L. REV. 717 (2009). 
43. Id. at 741–49. 
44. Michael M. O’Hear, Appellate Review of Sentence Explanations: Learning from the 
Wisconsin and Federal Experiences, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 751 (2009). 
45. Sara C. Benesh & Wendy L. Marinek, Context and Compliance: A Comparision of State 
Supreme Courts and the Circuits, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 795 (2009). 
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compliant.
46
  Professor Michael Heise provides an empirical perspective on 
criminal appeals in the federal courts.
47
  Drawing on data gathered by the 
United States Sentencing Commission, he outlines the general contours of the 
federal appellate courts’ criminal dockets.  He concludes, however, that the 
data are insufficient to allow for a meaningful assessment of this work, and 
identifies a number of limitations in the data that will have to be addressed to 
further develop our understanding of criminal appeals in the federal courts.
48
 
* * * 
We are grateful to all of our authors, other participants, and guests at the 
conference for making the event as lively and productive as it was in person, 
and for generating such useful contributions to the literature on criminal 
appeals.  We would also like to thank Dean Joseph Kearney of Marquette 
University Law School for his generous support and encouragement, and also 
the many members of the law school’s staff and administration for their work 
in putting on the conference.  Finally, we are grateful to the editorial staff of 
the Marquette Law Review for providing a forum for the conference papers 
and doing the hard work of bringing them into print. 
 
 
46. Id. at 814–16. 
47. Michael Heise, Federal Criminal Appeals: A Brief Empirical Perspective, 93 MARQ. L. 
REV. 825 (2009). 
48. Id. at 838–42. 
